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ABSTRACT
This article analyses why the political transformations following the Arab
Spring took different paths in Egypt and Tunisia. Based on data from field
interviews conducted between 2012 and 2018 as well as press analyses, we
argue that a strong factor why Tunisia was more successful in establishing
democracy is that it had a higher level of inter-elite trust. Moreover, we show
that the establishment of inter-elite trust depends on the presence of func-
tioning trust-building arenas during the transition and the early democratic
consolidation period. To investigate the role of inter-elite trust, we develop
a theoretical-analytical framework, drawing on Arab Spring literature, transi-
tion theory, scholarship on democratic consolidation, and research on trust.
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A plethora of thought-provoking works have tried to explain the success – or
more often failure – of democratization in authoritarian regimeswhose rulewas
challenged by the Arab Spring uprisings from 2011 onwards (e.g., Asseburg &
Wimmen, 2016; Cavatorta, 2015; Heydemann, 2016; Brownlee, Masoud, &
Reynolds, 2015). Within this literature, some authors rely on actor-centred
approaches to explain why Tunisia has democratized while other countries
have either returned to authoritarian rule or experienced civil wars (e.g.,
Asseburg & Wimmen, 2016; Heydemann, 2016). Others, by contrast, argue
that long-term structural factors were more important in determining both
the breakdown (or resilience) of authoritarian regimes and the success (or
failure) of the sometimes ensuing democratic experiments (e.g., Masoud,
2014; Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015).
Within transition theory, however, there is broad-based agreement that
elite actors play a crucial role during one important phase of transformation:
the interval between the breakdown of the old authoritarian regime and the
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passage of a new constitution (Geddes, 1999, p. 120, pp. 136–137; see e.g.,
Linz & Stepan, 1996; Rustow, 1970; Zayed, 2005). Yet, a better understanding
of the behaviour of Arab elites during this interval in Arab Spring countries
requires more investigation (see also Heydemann, 2016, pp. 202–203).
Comparing Tunisia and Egypt is theoretically intriguing in this regard. Until
early 2013, the two countries shared many similarities. In both cases, the old
authoritarian regimes presided over relatively strong state apparatuses.
However, neither regime could draw on oil rents to permanently secure the
loyalty of the security forces, or establish undisputed hereditary successions.
Thus, when confrontedwith strong popular uprisings, theirmilitaries sidedwith
the protesters or remained neutral, forcing incumbent autocrats to resign
(Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015). Both countries subsequently held free
elections to assemblies charged with drafting new constitutions. In both coun-
tries Islamist parties won these founding elections and assumed office.
Nevertheless, Tunisia institutionalized a democratic system, while Egypt’s post-
Mubarak trajectory experienced significant setbacks. Our research goal is to
determine why this was the case.
While in both countries secularist and Islamist elites were initially highly
polarized, a compromise between both camps strongly contributed to making
the Tunisian transition succeed, whereas the absence of such a compromise
hindered Egypt’s democratic experiment (Asseburg & Wimmen, 2016, pp.
14–15; Boubekeur, 2016). It has been cursorily argued that deep ‘distrust’
(Stepan & Linz, 2013, p. 23) prevented Islamist and secularist elites from
negotiating a settlement in Egypt, while the Islamists’ and secularists’ efforts
to overcome their mutual ‘distrust’ enabled an elite compromise in Tunisia
(Stepan, 2012, p. 92). Nevertheless, the role of inter-elite trust in influencing the
political transformation processes in Tunisia and Egypt – as well as in other Arab
Spring cases – has not yet been systematically explored. This deficit corre-
sponds to a similar gap in the broader research on democratic transformation,
which has attributed huge importance to ‘elite pacts’ (Geddes, 1999, pp. 120,
136–137; e.g., Linz & Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 2013)
without paying adequate attention to the role of inter-elite trust in the forging
of such pacts. Several studies on democracy emphasize the importance of
citizens’ trust in the political system. Social capital theory, in particular, assumes
that voluntary associations in civil society generate mutual trust between
citizens, thereby strengthening democratic institutions (e.g., Putnam, 1993,
2000). However, researchers are yet to thoroughly examine how trust (or
distrust) between elites impacts democratic transformations.
This article seeks to fill these gaps by asking two main questions. To what
extent can inter-elite trust (or distrust) explain the distinct transformation
paths in Egypt and Tunisia in the three years following the removal of their
former authoritarian rulers? And what conditions enabled or prevented the
building of inter-elite trust?
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Political elites, trust, and democratization: Towards a
theoretical-analytical model and research methodology
The pre-eminent role of elites during democratic transitions and the early
democratic consolidation period, when the institutions of the old regime are
dissolved or restricted and new rules of the political game are yet to be
established, is undisputed in transition theory and the broader democratiza-
tion literature (e.g., Linz & Stepan, 1996; Munck & Leff, 1997; O’Donnell et al.,
2013; Rustow, 1970). Leading transition scholars have shown that this wis-
dom remains relevant regarding the Arab Spring (Stepan & Linz, 2013) with
even proponents of structuralist explanations recognizing this finding
(Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015, pp. 186–198). While in transition
theory the concept of ‘elite’ is rarely precisely defined, we draw on
Asseburg and Wimmen (Asseburg & Wimmen 2016, p. 5) to focus on
those elite actors ‘who yield significant influence over the political
process’1 during the transformation period. Moreover, in line with Geddes’
(1999, p. 136) finding that ‘[s]uccessful pact making seems to require the
prior existence of well-organized parties able to make and keep commit-
ments’, we analyse political party elites as one important sub-section of the
national elite, while nevertheless constructing a theoretical-analytical frame-
work that is broad enough to also include other types of political elites.
Political negotiations by post-transition elites commonly include highly
contentious issues, such as creating constitution-drafting mechanisms, struc-
turing new institutions, and determining whether and what limits should be
placed on religious, military, and security institutions. Such controversial
matters normally have to be resolved through compromises rather than
zero-sum approaches (Hassan, 2013a), requiring elite adversaries to coop-
erate. As early as 1970, Rustow (1970, p. 358) stressed the necessity of a ‘first
grand compromise that establishes democracy.’ If major elite sections fail to
reach such a compromise, powerful veto players – such as the military – can
intervene to block democratization.
But what are the conditions that enable such compromise? Research on
trust shows that trust is usually the ‘precursor’ of compromise and consen-
sus building (Leach & Sabatier, 2005, p. 491). Defined, rather minimally, as
‘having faith or confidence in another’s propensity to keep promises, to
negotiate honestly, and to show respect for other points of view’ (ibid: 492),
trust is especially important in periods of uncertainty (McKnight & Chervany,
1996, p. 3) – such as political transformations. Our theoretical-analytical
model thus assumes that successful democratic transformations often
depend on a reasonable degree of inter-elite trust.
This corresponds with the literature on ‘power sharing’, which shows that
inter-elite trust and the readiness of opposing elites to express less confronta-
tional views of each other contribute to promoting stability and democratic
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consolidation (Bunte & Vinson, 2016; Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010). Our first
assumption also corresponds with the broader finding of the democratization
literature that trust (in the form of social capital or citizens’ trust in the political
system) generally strengthens democracy (Diamond, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996;
Putnam, 1993, 2000). Moreover, transition theory has also occasionally acknowl-
edged the necessity of inter-elite trust in principle. In 1999, Diamond (1999, pp.
207–208) noted that
‘trust in people may merit more sustained investigation. . . . If rival political elites
do not trust one another to honour agreements, it will be much more difficult for
them to institutionalize the pacts, settlements, understandings and mutual
restraints that stabilize politics and consolidate democracy at the elite level’.
But how is inter-elite trust established? Trust literature indicates that interper-
sonal trust is built through regular, direct interactions and face-to-face com-
munication, while clear rules and institutional frameworks governing these
interactions help to encourage trustworthiness (Leach & Sabatier, 2005, pp.
492–93; see also Rothstein, 2000). Thereby, trust evolves gradually and is
strengthened the more frequently individuals interact and the longer their
relationship lasts. By contrast, if fora that encourage trust building are lacking –
or are replaced by trust-inhibiting frameworks – trust and cooperation often
break down. Our second assumption, therefore, is that compromises between
post-transition elites are enabled when functioning trust-building arenas exist
during the transition and the early democratic consolidation period. We con-
struct our heuristic theoretical-analytical model as follows outlined in figure 1.
To trace the presence (or absence) of these two trajectories in the Tunisian
and Egyptian cases, we rely on process tracing in the form of theoretical-analytic
explanation (George & Bennett, 2005, esp. 207ff.), following the example of well-
known scholars who have applied the process-tracing method to cases of
democratic transformation (e.g., Brownlee, 2007, esp. 32–42).
Our comparative analysis also gauges the explanatory value of this
theoretical-analytical model against that of three other variables that the
literature has found to influence the establishment of elite compromises.
Breakdown of 
authoritarian 
regime 
Existence of 
trust-building 
arenas 
Trust among 
major political 
elites 
Greater likelihood for 
transition success 
Absence of 
trust-building 
arenas 
Distrust among 
major political 
elites 
Less likelihood for 
transition success 
Figure 1. Trust and transitions.
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The first is the distribution of power between competing elites (e.g., Munck
& Leff, 1997, p. 345). Much transition literature assumes that a stalemate of
power between opposing elites is conducive to elite pacts (McFaul, 2002,
p. 213). However, MacFaul’s (2002) analysis of the former Soviet Union
shows that where authoritarian regimes have crumbled due to revolutionary
mass protests such power stalemates often lead to protracted conflict rather
than democracy. This finding is relevant for Arab Spring countries in which
authoritarian rulers were likewise ousted through mass demonstrations.
Secondly, we examine the intervening role of the military in politics (e.g.,
Silverman, 2012), specifically with regard to how far it can enhance or inhibit
trust-building among party elites. And, thirdly, we assess the influence of
regional and international actors. McFaul (2002, pp. 241–242), for example,
finds that proximity to the West and the prospect of access to Western
institutions, such as the EU, can significantly strengthen democratic trans-
formation processes.
To test our argument, we draw on altogether 40 interviews conducted with
party elites in Tunisia and Egypt between 2012 and 2018, which we comple-
mented with 3 interviews conducted with local experts. Undoubtedly, inter-
views reflect interviewees’ perceptions of events and/or other individuals and,
therefore, provide subjective rather than objective accounts of political devel-
opments. However, trust – or distrust – is deeply affected by such perceptions,
making elite interviewing an appropriate method for our research question.
Although the majority of our interviews were conducted after 2013, the ones
conducted in 2012 in Egypt indicate that the post-2013 accounts by our
interviewees are not just ex-post rationalisations of the events. Moreover, we
triangulated our interview evidence with the analysis of public statements
made by relevant elites between 2011 and 2014. For each country, around
100 Arabic-language party elites’ statements in the press or party press releases
were analysed and strongly corroborated the interview data.
Our sample of political elites includes leading members of the main Islamist
and secularist parties whom we treat as representatives of the different ideo-
logical strands of political party elites in both countries. For Egypt, we incorpo-
rated members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) Freedom and Justice Party
(FJP), the Salafist al-Nour Party and the more moderate al-Wasat Party from the
Islamist camp; representatives of al-Wafd, the Social Democratic Party (SDP),
the Free Egyptians Party (FEP), and the Constitution Party (CP) from the
secularist, liberal camp; members of al-Karama, Popular Current (PC), the
Socialist Popular Alliance Party (SPAP), and Tagammu’ from the secularist, leftist
camp; and representatives of the Citizen Party and al-Muatamar from the old
regime elite (for a complete list of parties on both divides, see Rabie, 2012;
Saleh, 2013). For Tunisia, the sample comprises members of the Islamist party
Ennahda. From the secularist parties, we included representatives of Nidaa
Tounes (NT), which comprises members of the former Ben Ali regime; leaders
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from the centre-left Congress Party for the Republic (CPR), Ettakatol, and the
Progressive Democratic Party (PDP); and representatives from three major far-
left parties within the Popular Front (PF): the Workers’ Party, the Democratic
Patriots’ Movement, and al-Qotb (see appendix 1).
For both countries, our observation focussed especially on the period when
both Islamist and secularist party elites participated in the forging of rules for
a new regime, that is, the interval from the fall of Mubarak to Morsi’s 2012
constitutional declaration in the Egyptian case and the period of the
Constituent Assembly and the National Dialogue in the case of Tunisia.
Egypt
Prior to the Tahrir protests that toppled the Mubarak regime in February 2011,
there was notmuch cooperation between secularist and Islamist elites in Egypt.
The last joint electoral platform between Islamist and secularist opposition
elites dates back to 1984 when the then main liberal al-Wafd Party allied with
the then banned MB (Helal, 2010). In many subsequent elections secularist and
Islamist elites accused each other of having struck a deal with the regime at the
other side’s expense. Outside parliament there were periods of cooperation
between the MB and some secularist opposition elites – most notably, the
Enough (Kefaya) movement and ‘The National Association for Change’ in the
mid and late 2000s. However, such rapprochements remained ‘covered by
suspicions’2 and were mainly kept together by the protagonists’ common
opposition to Mubarak. Islamists also opined that some secularists enjoyed
too close relationships with the pre-2011 regime and thus could not be trusted.
One Islamist leader, interviewed in October 2012, said that ‘many of the seculars
and liberals have been aligned with despotism since the [early 1990s].’3
Following the ouster of Mubarak, relations between secularist and Islamist
elites became highly competitive, and both camps often refrained from pursu-
ing agreements with each other in favour of seeking bilateral deals with the
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) – which controlled the political
process in 2011/2012 – usually behind each other’s back. An SDP founding
member argued that ‘right after the revolution, secularists were still distrustful
of Islamists’.4 Similarly, a founding member of the FJP and cabinet member
under Morsi indicated that a short-lived alliance with the secularist, leftist al-
Karama Party in the 2011/2012 elections ‘was no real cooperation. Instead
they [al-Karama] just used us as a ladder’.5 A leading Salafi politician, inter-
viewed in October 2012, said that Islamists ‘could not ally with [secularists]
because they have a different identity . . . and view us as extremists’6 Shortly
after Mubarak’s departure, secularists and Islamists already started to separate
their protests from each other, even when they had similar goals. ‘We inten-
tionally didn’t share demonstrations with liberals [secularists] because we had
the impression that they did not want the interest of the country. They have
other objectives and wanted to take advantage of our mobilizational capacity
to forward their agenda . . . All they want is to tarnish us’, said a Salafi leader.7
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Distrust between secularist and Islamist elites increased as several attempts
at cooperation failed. One such effort was as early as February 2011 when the
National Association for Change called on all political parties and movements
to draft a common vision for the future. As per a leader of the SPAP:
‘a document was drafted that requested SCAF to form a presidential commit-
tee of five members, a government of national salvation, and a committee to
write the constitution. . . . But although the MB participated in drafting this
document, one week later, we were surprised to know that they had pre-
sented another document to SCAF, which was different, if not contradictory, to
the first document.’.8
Another attempt at cooperation came in March 2011 during the debates
preceding the first constitutional referendum. According to a long-time
leader of the leftist al-Tagammu’ Party, secularists and Islamists held over
32 meetings to agree on the content of the constitutional amendments. The
settlement stipulated that 50 per cent of the Constituent Assembly seats
would be allocated to ‘civil’ [non-Islamist] and 50 per cent to Islamist parties.
‘But then al-Wafd and the MB struck a secret deal whereby they counted al-
Wasat as a civil party, thereby giving a majority to the Islamists’.9 Distrust
thus also prevailed amongst secularist elites themselves.
A leading member of the MB’s Shura Council, interviewed in 2012,
indicated that the SCAF’s cementing of distrust between Islamists and
secularists started in early 2011 when
‘SCAF was telling the Islamists that they needed them because they were the
forces capable of ensuring stability while simultaneously having parallel meet-
ings with liberals [secularists] to frighten them from Islamists by emphasizing
the dangers of extremism’.10
This shows how the SCAF’s role during the interim period promoted distrust
between political foes, a pattern that continued till the 2011/2012 parlia-
mentary elections. As per a leftist politician,
‘the MB and the military were allies [back then]. During the [2011] parliamen-
tary elections, this alliance was very obvious. I was working in the electoral
district of North Cairo which was designed to include 3 million voters. All
political parties opposed the drawing of the district boundaries in this manner
which was imposed by SCAF .... Only the MB was the winner from this
strategy’.11
Another driver of distrust was a document on supra-constitutional principles
developed in March 2012 by the then SCAF-appointed deputy prime minister.
The document included principles to guide the constitution-making process –
which Islamists were expected to dominate – and proposed reserved powers
for the military but trimmed powers for religious institutions. Expectedly, the
document was accepted by secularists and rejected by Islamists, prompting
a leading MB member – interviewed in November 2012 – to state that ‘this
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document should never have gained the acceptance of any force but we were
surprised that some liberal [secularist] forces accepted it.12
However, from early 2011 to late 2012, not all secularists held the same
all-negative view of Islamists. Instead, the secularists were split into two
camps: camp (i) whose representatives were highly sceptical of Islamists –
such as leaders of the FEP, al-Tagammu’, and the Citizen Party, and camp (ii)
whose members believed that Islamists (especially MB and FJP Islamists)
could be worked with, such as leaders of the SDP, al-Wafd, al-Karama, the
PC, and the Constitution Party.
The two camps differed in their views on how far Islamists could be trusted as
sincere political players. The sceptical camp (i) did not view Islamist parties as
political forces with genuine popular support13 but rather as securing their
electoral successes via nondemocratic means such as buying voters. Similarly, it
regarded the Islamists’ mobilization tactics as ‘worse than those of the former
National Democratic Party’ (NDP).14 This camp also did not perceive Islamists as
patriotic actors but as forces seeking to incite civil strife between Egypt’s Christian
minority and its Muslim majority with the sole aim of erecting a theocratic state.
During the 2012 presidential election, a foundingmember of the FEP argued that
if Morsi won, Egyptians ‘would be facing a “welayat al-Faqih”’ state like Iran and
‘the constitution of Egypt would be the Quran’.15 As per a secularist activist
interviewed a few weeks after Morsi’s inauguration in 2012, ‘if the Brotherhood
managed to dominate the syndicates, the parliament and the presidency, we will
not have a civic state even if the constitution strictly stipulates one’.16 TheMBwas
never viewed by this camp as willing to reach a consensus with any secular
political force,17 but rather as a totalitarian movement seeking to ‘control the
people in a fascist and unjust dictatorship’.18
In contrast, the less sceptical camp (ii) initially had a more positive view of
Islamist elites. A founding member of al-Karama Party argued that he disagreed
with the MB ‘with regard to their political vision, and how they dominated state
institutions after their ascent to power’ but never ‘questioned their patriotism.’19
Elite members of this camp also concurred that Islamists enjoyed genuine
popular support, adhered to basic democratic principles, and were legitimate
political actors. According to a senior al-Wafdmember, although his party would
not form an electoral coalitionwith theMB, it could cooperate with themon bills,
following the conventional practices in parliament.20 However, the discourse of
the less sceptical secular elite camp took a turn after 2012 (e.g., SDP Press Release,
2 December 2012).21
One crucial institutional reason why trust between secularist and Islamist
elites further deteriorated following Mubarak’s departure is that the two elite
groups never had much time to interact and build mutual trust after the transi-
tion. The ideal arena for that – parliament – did not survive long enough to
perform this function, as its lower chamber was dissolved by the Supreme
Constitutional Court in June 2012, only six months after it had been elected.
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Moreover, with very few exceptions, parliament did not deal with controversial
pieces of legislation on which secularists and Islamists were in great disagree-
ment. Hence, Islamist and secularist elites hardly had the opportunity or need to
build consensus. A SPAP leader claimed that ‘the parliamentary experience was
too short. . ., the issues that emerged in Parliament did not unravel the differences
in the ideologies and programmes [of Islamists and secularists].’22 Similar views
were echoed by Islamists. According to a leading representative of the Salafist al-
Nour Party, secularist and Islamist elites attempted to cooperate during the
constitution-drafting process but failed:
‘During the 2012 parliament we were attending confidential meetings for
a month to make sure that the constituent assembly would include the MB, al-
Nour, and secularist parties, and to make sure that all figures were accepted
from all parties . . . [and] to get consensus especially around the controversial
articles. At this time, we got the approval of all parties for the article concern-
ing sharia. We were then very surprised to see all [secularist] parties with-
drawing [from the assembly]’. 23
The controversial constitution-writing process was delegated to another
body, a constituent assembly chosen by parliament, which, however, was
also dissolved by court order shortly afterwards. Moreover, the six months in
which parliament sat were also the months leading to the first presidential
election after 2011. Thus, political foes either preferred to wait until after the
election before investing in cross-ideological cooperation or were busy
preparing for the election. Consequently, even before Morsi became pre-
sident in June 2012, there was no forum to force secularist and Islamist elites
to sit together and interact. In the period between Mubarak’s departure in
February 2011 and Morsi’s removal in July 2013, the major part of Egypt’s
secularist and Islamist elite sat together in parliament for less than five
months. This lack of functioning arenas for inter-elite trust building made
it very difficult for Islamist and secularist elites to develop mutual trust.
Although parliament’s upper chamber, elected in January 2012, remained in
session after the lower house was dissolved, it had much more skewed repre-
sentation – with Islamists controlling over 85 per cent of its seats – and was
rather powerless, even after it was abruptly given legislative powers. Deadlock
inside the upper house was fostered as secularist party elites viewed the MB as
‘not willing to compromise’.24 According to a leading PC member, the MB
‘never sought real cooperation’ in the upper chamber but ‘dealt with it as if
they owned it and . . . relied on [their] organizational capacity to achieve this’.25
An SDP founding member indicated that parliamentary sessions were marked
by ‘cold discussions under an atmosphere of huge distrust.’26 Moreover, media
soon replaced parliament as themain arena for interaction. This prompted both
secularist and Islamist leaders to express even more polarizing views of each
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other to score points in public. A leading representative of theMuatamar Party
claimed that since then ‘there was no cooperation, only conflict’.27
The split between Islamist and secularist elites was also propelled by the
Islamists’ view of their secularist opponents. The MBwas very sceptical of forces
that had been close to the Mubarak regime. Leading MB representatives also
displayed huge distrust of the FEP and especially its founder Naguib Sawiris, the
Coptic business tycoon, arguing that he ‘instrumentalized the media to incite
the Christian minority against the MB and the Salafists’.28 Nevertheless, secu-
larist and Islamist elites made a last attempt to cooperate before the second
round of the 2012 presidential election. In the so-called Fairmont Declaration,
secularists and Islamists agreed to back Morsi over Ahmed Shafik, who was
viewed as a continuation of the Mubarak regime. The agreement was written
and signed by Morsi himself.29 This support by secularist elites for Morsi was
conditional on creating a balanced constituent assembly, appointing a prime
minister on whom all elite forces could agree, and appointing four vice-
presidents (including one Copt and one woman). Soon, however, secularist
elites accused theMBof reneging on its promises. A leadingmember of al-Wafd
Party’s Supreme Committee contended that the MB violated the Fairmont
Declaration, and hence ‘all political forces lost faith and trust in the MB as
they broke all their promises’.30
Conversely, the MB viewed the secularist parties as determined to make the
Morsi presidency fail from the start. As per a member of the Brotherhood Shura
Council, interviewed in November 2012, ‘many [secularists] refused to join the
Morsi cabinet after the election. Where is patriotism and serving Egypt in
that?’31 This incident – and subsequent unsuccessful invitations for dialogue
fromMorsi – point to a distinction between trust generation and trust-inducing
behaviours. Specifically, although there might be opportunities for trust
building, if the behaviour of one party is self-contradictory, such opportunities
are unlikely to actually generate trust. The behaviour of Morsi while in power –
especially following the constitutional declaration in November 2012, with
which he set his decisions above judicial review – was such that secularists
were unlikely to trust his invitations for cooperation irrespective of the oppor-
tunities that the latter might have represented. Other examples include Morsi’s
defiant removal of the Prosecutor General and his direct attack against the
Supreme Constitutional Court.
Indeed, party statements show that the discourse of the formerly less
sceptical secularist camp (ii) took a turn after Morsi’s constitutional declaration.
Specifically, camp (ii) started to view the MB as an illegitimate political actor.
First, it argued that the MB had lost its ‘moral legitimacy’32 because it sought to
monopolize power and failed to cooperate with secularists in the interim
period. Then, it denied that the MB had electoral legitimacy, arguing that
Morsi was following the orders of the MB’s Supreme Guide who held no
electoral mandate. Ousting Morsi would consequently be ‘admissible from
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a democratic point of view’ (SDP Press Release, 8 July 2013). Leaders of the SDP
went on to claim that the MB’s constitutional declaration was ‘a coup against
Egypt as a whole’ (SDP Press Release 2, December 2012). This rapprochement
between the formerly less sceptical secularist camp (ii) and the sceptical
secularist camp (i) peaked in summer 2013 and ultimately culminated in
massive protests that prepared the ground for Morsi’s ouster. Most secularist
elites shifted from labelling the MB and the Islamists aligned with it as ‘illegi-
timate political actors’ to calling them ‘terrorists’ and ‘murderers’ (e.g., SDP
Press Release, 8 July 2013). In this context, the military came forward as the
protector of the anti-MB forces and, followingMorsi’s ouster, assumed power in
an interim-period that was followed by the election of General al-Sisi. From late
2012 onwards, the MB’s discourse also sharpened. Leading MB members
argued that former NDP forces and other elements of the ‘deep state’ were
planning to stage a counter-revolution (e.g., MB/FJP Press Release,
29 June 2013).33 The MB also began to denounce all criticism against itself as
‘conspiracies’ and projected an image of an existential battle between itself and
the elite forces loyal to the old regime.
Other factors also negatively affected trust building in Egypt. Firstly, given
that Islamists won around 70 per cent of the seats (and 65 per cent of the
votes) in the first post-Mubarak election (Hassan, 2013b) – and scored
similarly strong victories in the constitutional referendums of March 2011
and December 2012 – they had no real incentive to invest in building trust
and compromise across the ideological aisle. Moreover, distrust between
secularist and Islamist party elites was echoed and sometimes encouraged
by party members, media circles and/or business and civil society actors
affiliated with each party bloc. One famous chanting slogan in the MB’s pro-
Morsi demonstrations was ‘Be mad President’, an appeal for Morsi to be
tougher and more assertive towards secularists. Conversely, secular media
was over-sympathetic with secularist parties and ‘gave them space and even
asked them to be more vocal against Islamists’.34
Finally, regional powers had their role. With the Brotherhood enjoying
close relationships with the Qatari regime and anti-MB forces receiving
signals from the Saudi and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) governments
that they could depend on financial backing if they stepped up their
opposition to Morsi, additional trust-inhibiting forces were at play. As per
official Egyptian figures, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided Egypt
with more than $ UD 21 billions of financial aid between 2011 and 2014,35
indicating their huge influence. With both the secularist and the Islamist
camp having a possible external bail-out of the economy if they governed,
the urge to compromise was reduced.
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Tunisia
Tunisia's post-transition elites had more prior interaction compared to Egypt’s,
which contributed to the building of personal ties and minimal mutual trust
before the transition. In October 2005, Ennahda negotiated a joint platform
with the then main secularist opposition parties (the CPR, Ettakatol, the PDP,
and the Workers’ Party, which held seats in the 2011 Constituent Assembly).
The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms in Tunisia, which comprised
different secularist and Islamist opposition forces, issued a communiqué cover-
ing several crucial issues, such as women’s rights, and the relationship between
state and religion (Stepan, 2012). Meherzia Labidi, the first vice president of the
Constituent Assembly from Ennahda, stated that this facilitated cooperation in
the Constituent Assembly after 2011, ‘as many of us [secularist and Islamist
deputies] already knew each other, and some of us had built personal ties’.36
This is in strong contrast to Egypt, where rapprochements between Islamist and
secularist elites before 2011 never developed into an ideological agreement on
how society should be governed but, instead, just constituted temporary
alliances to oppose the Mubarak regime.
The moderation of Ennahda, including the party’s renunciation of the
violent forms of resistance it had sometimes employed in the 1980s and
1990s and its increased openness to democratic rule, was crucial in enabling
trust building among the opposition (Angrist 2013, pp. 556–559). Moreover,
during the repression of Ennahda in the 1990s, some of its leaders joined
secular political parties or civil society organizations (CSOs) (ibid.: 558),
including the powerful labour union Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail
(UGTT).37 Hamza Hamza, a former member of Ennahda’s central committee,
for instance, joined the PDP (ibid.). In addition, some secularist and Islamist
opposition leaders liaised in exile, such as Ennahda’s leader Rachid
Ghannouchi and the CPR’s party president Moncef Marzouki in France.38
Such interactions facilitated the building of trust after the transition.
The establishment of the 18 October Coalition signalled the emergence
of a more unified opposition to the Ben Ali regime. Consequently,
Abderrahim Zouari and Mohamed Ghériani, both of whom acted as
Secretary Generals of the ruling Rassemblement Constitutionnel
Démocratique (RCD) for some time, held informal negotiations with Rachid
Ghannouchi in the United Kingdom aimed at luring Ennahda away from the
18 October Coalition and dividing the opposition.39 Moreover, Islamist and
RCD leaders were sometimes connected through family and/or personal ties
as exemplified by Ben Ali’s Prime Minister Hamed Karoui who was
acquainted to the later Ennahda Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali through his
son who was a former Ennahda activist (Kapitalis, 5 September 2012). Such
informal interactions – which were not paralleled in the Egyptian case –
contributed to the establishment of both personal contacts and a culture of
564 M. HASSAN ET AL.
political negotiation that facilitated inter-elite trust building in formal arenas
after the transition.
Like in Egypt, the post-2011 secularist elite in Tunisia consisted of camp
(i), which comprised political leaders more sceptical of Ennahda (e.g., leaders
of far-leftist parties within the PF, such as the Workers’ Party, the Democratic
Patriots’ Movement, and al-Qotb), and camp (ii), which comprised political
leaders less sceptical of Ennahda – such as leading representatives of the
CPR, Ettakatol, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and NT. NT, founded in 2012,
comprised two large blocs: old regime elites and leftist leaders with roots in
the workers’ movement and the UGTT.40
Generally, however, secularist and Islamist elites in Tunisia have
embraced more positive views of each ‘other’ than their Egyptian counter-
parts. For instance, Tunisian president and NT leader, Beji Caid Essebsi,
stated that ‘there is some backwardness [within Ennahda] but not to
a suicidal extent’, adding that Ennahda was ultimately most interested in
electoral success.41 Moreover, NT’s leaders do not necessarily view
Ennahda’s Islamist nature as a problem, as long as the party adopts
a moderate view of Islam and explicitly distances itself from violent
Islamists. For Essebsi, ‘there are two versions of Islam: a violent, misled
one and a moderate one, true to Tunisian culture’.42 While there were
supporters of both views within Ennahda, he explained, it was important
that the moderates had the upper hand. Moreover, several elites within the
less sceptical secularist camp (ii) have viewed Ennahda principally as
a legitimate political actor, such as leaders of the DA, the CPR, and
Ettakatol.43
In their discourse, key Ennahda leaders also displayed higher levels of trust of
secularist elites than the MB in Egypt and continuously stressed their desire for
‘consensus’ and ‘dialogue’ with their secularist opponents (e.g., Ennahda Press
Releases, 9 May 2013; 11 January 2014). However, although important Ennahda
leaders described old regime figures within NT, such as Essebsi, as trustworthy
politicians,44 several segments in the party feared that the old regime forces
within NT wanted to drive Ennahda underground.45
The post-transition institutional setting in Tunisia, unlike that in Egypt, has
provided Islamist and secularist elites with multiple arenas in which they have
interacted almost continuously since 2011, facilitating the building of mutual
trust. In early 2011, the Ben Achour Commission, under the interim govern-
ment of Essebsi, crafted the rules for both the first democratic elections and
the Constituent Assembly charged with drafting the new constitution. The
commission included members of all political parties and acted as a highly
‘effective consensus-building bod[y]’ (Stepan, 2012, p. 92). The continuous
interaction between secularist and Islamist elites increased trust between
segments of Ennahda and the old regime elite of the RCD, now represented
in NT. According to Said Aidi, a NT cabinet member in the second transitional
government of 2011: ‘contacts with Ennahda were already built when we
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handed over [Essebsi’s interim] government to the [Ennahda-led] troika . . . we
then also continued to meet them, for example, at receptions or on talk
shows’.46
More importantly, the Constituent Assembly ran from its election in
October 2011 until it approved the constitution in early 2014. It enabled
regular face-to-face communication between secularist and Islamist party
leaders, facilitating higher levels of trust. Moreover, from 2011 to 2014,
Ennahda governed as part of a troika with the secularist CPR and Ettakatol
whose establishment was facilitated by the pre-existing personal relations
between Rachid Ghannouchi and Moncef Marzouki.47 According to Said Aidi
from NT, Minister of Employment in the second transition government, this
readiness to refrain from monopolizing executive power distinguished
Ennahda from the behaviour of the MB and Morsi in Egypt.48 Accordingly,
it was crucial in enabling secularist elites to develop trust in Ennahda. An
Ettakatol member explained that although Ennahda’s programme was
totally different from that of Ettakatol, she could work with Ennahda,
because it did not monopolize power when in office.49 The fact that
Ennahda held proportionally less parliamentary seats than the MB did in
Egypt played an important role in that. According to a Tunisian expert
‘Ennahda never sought to dominate because they knew they wouldn’t be
able to numerically. In Egypt, however, the Brotherhood had the numbers
that enabled them to dominate.’50
The Constituent Assembly was an arena for discussion on controversial
issues on which Islamist and secularist elites had to find consensus.
A ‘consensus committee’ was formed inside the assembly. Noura Ben
Hassen, a CPR deputy in the Constituent Assembly, explained that:
‘parties were not represented [in this committee] according to their seat
shares in the assembly, but more equally. Whenever there was deadlock in
the discussions on the floor, we took things to this committee and then
discussed the issue until we reached consensus’.51
According to Moncef Cheikh-Rouhou, a leader and deputy of the DA,
a famous example of such a consensus was the removal of references to
sharia from the constitution,52 which again showed secularist elites that
Ennahda was willing to make serious concessions (Angrist, 2013, p. 562).
In Egypt, by contrast, the share of Islamists in the first Constituent Assembly
exceeded their seat share in the 2012 parliament. Moreover, within Tunisia’s
Constituent Assembly, shifting coalitions were formed and sometimes cut
across the Islamist–secularist divide, enhancing the development of mutual
trust. For instance, some Ennahda deputies voted – together with secularist
deputies – against a paragraph stipulating the ‘complementary’ - rather than
equal - role of women into the constitution.53
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When discussions within the assembly reached a stalemate in mid-2013 –
after Ennahda had presented a draft constitution considered as too Islamist
by many secularist party elites and after two leftist opposition leaders were
assassinated by violent Salafists – polarization between secularists and
Islamists increased again, threatening to derail the transition. Various secu-
larist parties and CSOs, including the UGTT, demonstrated for the ouster of
the troika, while Ennahda supporters staged protests in support of the
government. Concurrently, both international donors and businessmen for-
merly close to the Ben Ali regime, who had initially supported the Ennahda
government in exchange for its adherence to a liberal economic agenda,
began to withdraw their support from Ennadha (Boubekeur, 2015, p. 3–4).
During the 2013 crisis, Ennahda’s harshest critics (leading PF members) in
the sceptical camp (i) accused Ennahda of ‘monopolis[ing] power and
decision making inside the Constituent Assembly’ and of side-lining secu-
larist forces (e.g., PF Press Release, 1 July 2013). Some believed that Ennahda
had links to terrorists and shared some responsibility for the murders of the
two leftist politicians (e.g., PF Press Release, 3 October 2013), but they never
described the party as a terrorist organization in and of itself (e.g., PF Press
Release, 3 July 2014). In fact, the PF condemned the violent clearance of the
pro-Morsi protests in Egypt in 2013 (e.g., PF Press Release, 16 August 2013)
and called for the MB’s reintegration into the political process, signalling
Ennahda that even its strongest critics would not criminalize it.
Moreover, elites of the less sceptical secularist camp (ii), such as NT, the
DA, the CPR, and Ettakatol, continued to view Ennahda as a legitimate
political actor.54 For instance, Ettakatol leader Elias Fakhfakh, the then
minister of finance, stated that to solve the crisis, there was ‘no solution
without Ennahda’.55 Other secularist elites from the less sceptical camp also
continued to acknowledge Ennahda’s strong popular support and demo-
cratic election successes.56
In this situation, the National Dialogue led by the so-called Quartet of
CSOs that included the UGTT brought the adversaries together for several
months of talks. The UGTT had maintained significant autonomy from the
Ben Ali regime and its union structures had provided the organizational
backbone of the Arab Spring demonstrations that had led to his fall (Angrist,
2013, pp. 559–561). Moreover, in 2013, it was among the most influential
organizations that protested against the troika. Thus, the UGTT had both the
moral and the mobilizational leverage to pressure the competing elite
camps, and the Ennahda government in particular, to come to one table
and negotiate seriously with each other. Once the National Dialogue was
established, the UGTT was directly involved and the negotiation skills of its
General Secretary Houcine Abassi contributed significantly to the dialogue’s
success.57
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Within the National Dialogue process, another consensus committee was
formed outside the Constituent Assembly,58 enabling agreements on pre-
viously unresolved issues so that the constitution – which, even according to
critics, constituted the ‘expression of a compromise between culturally
different groups’ (Redissi 2016, p. 20) – could be finalized in 2014.
Prior to the compromise between the main secularist and Islamist elites,
there was a stalemate of power between the two sides and given the
extensive mobilization of both secularist and Islamist activists, open conflict
rather than cooperation might well have emerged. However, according to
Ennahda’s leader Rachid Ghannouchi, Ennahda realized that it had lost the
support of many Tunisians, owing to its inability to address important
popular needs.59 Leaders of NT, for their part, did not hold executive
power and were afraid of being marginalized from formal politics60 if the
transition continued without their participation. Moreover, both secularist
and Islamist elites sought to avoid chaos, civil war and a disruption of the
transition61 and still trusted that their ideological adversaries would want to
do the same. For instance, Rafik Abdelsalam, the former foreign minister
from Ennahda, concurred that there was some trust between Ennahda and
NT that was ‘built’ through ‘dialogue’, while adding that other Arab Spring
cases showed that Tunisia’s political leaders either had to face the risk of
civil war or military rule ‘or sit on the table and reach a compromise – [so]
there [was] no other alternative’.62
Equally important, the army refrained from intervening in politics and
allowed for the National Dialogue and other trust-building arenas to func-
tion. Nevertheless, leading Ennahda members were anxious ‘to avoid the
Egyptian scenario’63 and, according to former Prime Minister Ali Larayed,
Ennahda leaders did not want a coup in Tunisia.64 Elite representatives of
NT, in turn, were confident that Ennahda’s leaders were rational political
actors who would seek to avoid such an escalation.65
Moreover, following the moderation of Ennahda, the EU had established
working relations with the Islamist party and supported Tunisia’s democratic
transformation (Colombo & Voltolini, 2017). In 2012, the EU had established
a ‘Privileged Partnership’ with Tunisia and from 2011 to 2013 had provided
the country with 445 million Euro in development assistance (ibid: 11).
During the 2013 crisis, various international actors pressured both
Ennahda and NT to seek a compromise (Boubekeur, 2015, p. 4). European
actors in particular also facilitated interaction between the secularist and the
Islamist elite camps. According to Rafik Abdelsalam from Ennahda,
a meeting between Essebsi and Ghannoushi in Paris in August 2013 was
crucial in convincing Ennahda to join the National Dialogue that finally
ended the 2013 political crisis.66 Once it had begun, the EU and other
international actors supported the dialogue process through technical
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measures and expertise, while also pressuring NT to compromise with
Ennahda.67
After Ennahda and NT became the biggest forces in the 2014 elections
and Ennahda joined the NT-led coalition government in 2015, elite repre-
sentatives of both parties further increased their cooperation.68 However,
many activists in NT continued to disapprove of the ‘consensus’ with
Ennahda, which Essebsi and other top-level leaders had forged without
consulting the party’s base.69 Similarly, regarding the consensus, former
Prime Minister Ali Larayed from Ennahda stated that ‘of course, our
[party] base [did] not accept such a project’. Describing Ennahda’s hier-
archical structure as having played an important role in enabling the
compromise with NT, he elaborated that the party’s leaders had discussed
a lot with their rank and file until they had accepted it ‘even if they don’t
understand’.70
Conclusion
Following the Arab Spring, inter-elite trust between secularists and Islamists
played a crucial role in enabling Tunisia’s democratization process, while the
lack of it contributed significantly to Egypt’s democratic regression. As for
the conditions that enabled, or prevented, the establishment of such inter-
elite trust, our findings show that the presence (or absence) of functioning
trust-building arenas in the period from the breakdown of the old author-
itarian regimes to the passing of new constitutions played a key role. In
Tunisia, various institutions enabled regular communication and face-to-face
interactions between secularist and Islamist elites, promoting the building of
inter-elite trust. In Egypt, the absence or dysfunction of such institutions
prevented the establishment of inter-elite trust and, hence, political com-
promises between secularist and Islamist elites.
Concurrently, other variables also impacted the ability and the willingness of
these competing political elites to interact in trust-building arenas. In particular,
these were the differing political roles played by the two countries’ armed forces,
the distribution of power between the competing elite forces, and the interven-
ing influence of key regional and international actors. Moreover, in the Tunisian
case, personal contacts between pre-transition elites also facilitated the building
of inter-elite trust after the end of authoritarianism. Future research should
further explore how these other variables affect the building of inter-elite trust.
Moreover, it should investigate in how far the theoretical-analytical model we
developed to analyse the role of inter-elite trust also applies to political elites
other than party elites.
On a broader theoretical level, our findings suggest that transition theory
and the wider research on democratization, on the one hand, and the
literature on trust, on the other, should be further integrated. Existing
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research has comprehensively investigated the role that both trust within
civil society and citizens’ trust in political institutions can play in promoting
democracy. However, there is a need to further explore the impact that
interpersonal trust between political elites has on the prospects of demo-
cratic transition and long-term democratic consolidation.
Thereby, future research could also investigate the conditions under
which inter-elite trust may not strengthen but rather weaken democratic
consolidation – a research agenda that would correspond to calls to inves-
tigate the ‘dark side of social capital’ (here, the ‘dark side’ of social trust) at
the level of (civil) society (e.g., Van Deth & Zmerli, 2010). In Tunisia, for
instance, the coalition between elite representatives of NT and Ennahda in
both parliament and government from 2015 onwards left the Tunisian polity
without any meaningful political opposition, weakening Tunisia’s multiparty
system. Similarly, NT’s and Ennahda’s relationship at the elite level also
prevented the two parties from meaningfully addressing several issues
that are crucial for the consolidation of democracy, such as transitional
justice, corruption and social inequality (Boubekeur, 2016). Moreover, in
late 2018, discontent among NT members who had opposed the consensus
with Ennahda but had been ignored by the party’s elite combined with
personal rivalries between Prime Minster Youssef Chaed and Hafez Chaed
Essebsi, NT’s Executive Director and Béji Caid Essebi’s son, to cause a split
within NT that ultimately also broke the relationship between Béji Caid
Essebi and Ennahda’s leader Rachid Ghannouchi at the elite level.71
Just like the role played by some of its followers in strengthening the
uncompromising stance of the Egyptian MB, these dynamics show that
political elites do not operate in a vacuum. Thus, future research should
also explore how such elites are linked to their social constituencies and
how these constituencies influence trust and cooperation at the elite level.
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Appendix 1. Table of Interviewees per country
A. Egypt
Ideology Party Interviewee, Place and Date of Interview
Islamists Freedom and
Justice Party
Founding member, former cabinet minister under Morsi, Istanbul,
29 July, 2015
Former MP of the party and member of the MB’s Shura Council,
Cairo, 15 November 2012
the Salafist al-Nour
Party
Leading representative, Alexandria, 17 September 2015
Salafi leader and member of the 2012 Constituent Assembly,
Cairo, 15 October 2012
al-Wasat Party Party Spokesperson, Istanbul, 30 July 2015
Secularists al-Wafd Member of Party Supreme Committee, Cairo, 31 August 2015
Assistant Secretary General, Cairo, 22 August 2015
Social Democratic
Party
Party Vice President, Cairo, 18 August, 2015
Founding member, Cairo, 19 August, 2015
Free Egyptians
Party
Founding member and member of the Committee for
International and External Relations, Cairo, 23 August 2015
Leading member, Cairo, 27 February 2013; 5 September 2015
Constitution Party Party Spokesperson, Cairo, 31 August 2015
Founder and Party Secretary for Public Action. He is also founder
of Kefaya Movement and National Association for Change,
Cairo, 22 May 2012
Leftists al-Karama Secretary of Organisation, Cairo, 2 September 2015
Popular Current Organizer of Hamdeen Sabahi’s 2012 and 2014 Presidential
Campaign, Cairo, 1 September 2015
Secretary of Organization, Cairo, 15 September 2015
Socialist Popular
Alliance Party
Party President, Cairo, 1 September 2015
Revolutionary
Socialists
Leading member, Cairo, 23 October 2012
Tagammu’ Head of the Party's Advisory Council, former Secretary General,
Cairo, 31 August 2015
Member of the Political Bureau and Editor-in-chief of the party's
newspaper, Cairo, 13 June 2012
Old
regime
al-Muatamar Vice President and Spokesperson, Cairo, 24 August 2015
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